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(Mis)Appropriations of Gadamer in Qualitative Research: A Husserlian 
Critique (Part 1) 
 
 





Within the Husserlian phenomenological philosophical tradition, description and interpretation 
co-exist. However, teaching the practice of phenomenological psychological research requires 
careful articulation of the differences between a descriptive and an interpretive relationship to 
what is provided by qualitative data. If as researchers we neglect the epistemological foundations 
of our work or avoid working through difficult methodological issues, then our work invites 
dismissal as inadequate science, undermining the effort to strongly establish psychology along 
qualitative lines. The first article in this two-part discussion provides a Husserlian investigation of 
the meaning of ‘method’ for psychology as a human science. This investigation is undertaken in 
the light of some researchers’ appropriations of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in the 
service of non-methodical praxes. The second article will address some implications of the attempt 
to structure qualitative psychological research along ‘Gadamerian’ lines, taking seriously the 







The question of method is a primary point of 
contention between those advocating a descriptive 
phenomenological approach to qualitative research 
and those advocating an interpretive approach. The 
descriptive psychological research method delineated 
by Giorgi (2009) is shaped by the phenomenological 
philosophical method of Edmund Husserl (1859-
1938), whereas advocates of interpretive approaches, 
sometimes described as ‘hermeneutic’ or ‘interpretive 
phenomenology’ approaches, frequently reference the 
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1900-2002) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). 
Examples include Van Manen’s (1990) hermeneutic 
phenomenology and the interpretive phenomeno- 
logical analysis of Smith, Flower and Larkin (2009). 
These approaches tend often invoke Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics while appropriating key 
praxis terms from the technical vocabulary of 
Husserl’s phenomenological philosophical method.  
 
In this article I argue that it is a disservice to students 
to blur or oversimplify the differences between 
descriptive and interpretive phenomenological 
research approaches, because they each offer 
fundamentally different conceptions of perception, 
understanding and method. The two approaches 
therefore constitute the research situation in 
profoundly different ways. However, within a 
philosophical context, these differences do not 
represent an intrinsic antagonism between description 
and interpretation. Mohanty (1987) summarizes the 
relationship between these two philosophical currents 
in phenomenology as follows: 
 
In the course of the history of the 
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phenomenological movement, two kinds of 
phenomenology have come to compete with 
each other: descriptive phenomenology and 
hermeneutic phenomenology. The former 
chooses a perceptual model to understand all 
human experience, the latter a textual model. 
For the former, the things to be described are 
given … for the other, the textual model, 
nothing is given … the text qua text is an 
interpretive task, an Aufgabe, and its 
interpretation involves a community of 
interpreters, rules of interpretation and a 
history of interpretation … the very idea of 
‘grasping’ a sense is rejected along with the 
idea of the meaning of a text. (p. 52, 
emphasis added) 
 
Within the context of qualitative psychological 
research the situation is different, because in order to 
do justice to the interrelatedness of phenomenological 
description and interpretation, a qualitative method 
would need to acknowledge both the descriptive and 
interpretive dimensions of its praxis.  
 
More than merely asserting that there are interpretive 
and descriptive features, exponents of such 
approaches would need to carefully delineate both the 
interpretive and descriptive moments in the praxis 
they propose. Such care is very necessary both 
conceptually and in order to enable students to 
properly grasp the different research attitudes that 
pertain to each standpoint. The exponents of such a 
method would need to educate practitioners in the 
lived-experience of both standpoints, since they imply 
different relationships to the given, and provide 
explicit guidance so that researchers learn to shift 
perspectives from the interpretive to the descriptive as 
required during the research process. Research is 
impossible without a perspective from which it is 
conducted; psychological research is an expression of 
a particular interest. Descriptive research demands 
fidelity to the given and is impossible if the lived-
experience of such fidelity is not internalized by 
student-practitioners. 
 
The central concern of this two-part article is the 
teaching and praxis of descriptive phenomenological 
psychological research in psychology. I have adopted 
a mixed philosophical-psychological perspective 
shaped by the philosophical phenomenology of 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, as well as Giorgi’s 
phenomenological psychology. Part 1 of this article is 
a Husserlian exploration of the meaning of ‘method’ 
for psychological human science. Part 2 considers 
some implications of the attempt to structure 
qualitative psychological research in accordance with 
‘Gadamerian’ lines, taking seriously the references to 
his work made by researchers such as Van Manen and 
Smith.  
The Interrelatedness of Hermeneutics and 
Phenomenology 
 
Mohanty (1984) observes that from a philosophical 
perspective there need be no intrinsic conflict 
between description and interpretation because in 
Husserl’s thought “hermeneutics and phenomenology 
coexist [since] being given and being interpreted are 
descriptions of the same situation from two different 
levels of discourse” (Mohanty, 1984, p. 117, 
emphasis added). In the first volume of Ideas, §3 
Husserl (1982) affirms the perceptual presence-for-us 
of the objects of consciousness themselves in their 
‘personal’ selfhood, which can be described just as 
they present themselves to consciousness. At the 
same time Husserl affirms that a scientific perspective 
is a specialized, adopted attitude within which 
scientists constitute (not ‘construct’) their objects of 
inquiry
1
. Consequently then, for phenomenological 
psychology the given can be described within the 
limits in which it is given to the researcher’s 
consciousness within a chosen, intersubjective 
scientific perspective.  
 
In a broad sense this choice of attitude in relation to 
the given can be correctly termed interpretive. 
Assuming a scientific attitude or a psychological 
versus a sociological or anthropological attitude 
signifies the adoption of a particular perspective over 
and against other possible perspectives
2
.  These can 
accurately be described as interpretive choices and 
they flow from the specifiable, motivating interest 
with which we engage the given. Thus, within the 
chosen perspective, what is given to the researcher’s 
consciousness can be rigorously described as it 
presents itself, within the limits of that 
presentification, without adding non-given meanings, 
in accordance with Husserl’s Principle of All 
Principles in §24 of the first volume of his Ideas 
(1982, p. 44). In this way, descriptive psychological 
                                                 
1
 Fink’s (1995) Sixth Cartesian Meditation, composed in 
close dialogue with Husserl, notes that “Worldly [empirical] 
science, originating in the natural attitude, refers to the 
existent as if beyond it no thematic inquiry were possible ... 
[science phenomenologically understood], on the contrary, 
when it refers to the existent, is from the outset open to the 
constitutive horizon of the existent, it takes the existent as a 
result of constitution … only through the phenomenological 
reduction and … insight into the constitutive sense of being 
… do these sciences themselves become understandable in 
the ultimate sense of their relation to the existent” (p. 149). 
2
 From a Husserlian perspective one would never claim that 
psychological meanings are immanent in a subject’s 
experience ‘in itself’ because for phenomenology there is 
no ‘in itself’; meanings are always for consciousness, not in 
themselves. Hence psychological meanings are only present 
for those consciousnesses that want to grasp a phenomenon 
psychologically; this is so even if psychology as a discipline 
is incompletely founded. 
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researchers follow in Husserl’s footsteps, 
demonstrating fidelity to psychical phenomena as 
they are given to us. The initial, high-level 
interpretive choice supports phenomenologists’ 
practice of description without intrinsic conflict. 
Within the practice of Husserlian phenomenology, 
description and interpretation refer to different 
discursive levels of the researcher’s relationship to the 
given (Mohanty, 1984).  
 
Rampant confusion results when researchers conflate 
these discursive levels, for example due to 
epistemological naïveté, or make the difference 
between description and interpretation absolute due to 
a misplaced purism. For this reason, Mohanty (1984) 
argues that advocates of descriptive and interpretive 
approaches “can be either naïve or self-critical. When 
they are naïve, they perceive each other as opposed. 
When they are self-critical, they recognize each other 
as complementary” (p. 60). Consequently, it would be 
fallacious to argue that qualitative psychological 
research can only be descriptive. Likewise, it would 
be naïve to argue that qualitative research can only 
be, or is always, interpretive.  
 
Articulating the implications of the complementarity 
of description and interpretation for the practice of 
psychological research is an important task. However 
descriptive psychologists must articulate the 
methodical phenomenological standpoint in its own 
terms in relation to its hermeneutic ‘other’ prior to 
articulating their co-presence within Husserlian 
phenomenological praxis. I claim this order of 
priority for two reasons. First, the importation of 
guiding assumptions from philosophical hermeneutics 
into psychological research by qualitative researchers 
is often accomplished in a philosophically superficial 
manner that neglects problematic epistemological 
consequences, for example the virtually ignoring of 
method. Second, a sloganistic echoing of hermeneutic 
and postmodern assumptions, unaccompanied by a 
careful examination of the implications of these 
philosophies for psychology, serves to conceal 
questionable premises regarding interpretation.  
 
While it might appear that bypassing careful 
discussions of epistemological-methodological issues 
in favour of an almost exclusive emphasis on praxis 
yields more flexible ‘user-friendly’ approaches to 
qualitative research, such a strategy simultaneously 
renders the qualitative research movement vulnerable 
to (and deserving of) critique for conceptual 
incoherence. Such deficits strengthen the hand of 
empiricist psychologists like Proctor and Capaldi 
(2006) who largely dismiss qualitative psychological 
research as a misguided attempt to evade the demands 
of genuine scientific inquiry, an attempt bolstered by 
faulty arguments resembling those advanced in 
antiquity by the Sophists (p. 176).   
Absorbed by mainstream academic culture, the 
premises of philosophical hermeneutics are often 
unrecognized as questionable assumptions. Thus one 
often encounters carelessly absolute assertions 
regarding method and interpretation in the qualitative 
literature.
3
  At the same time, the extent to which the 
empirical-positivist model is hegemonic and shapes 
popular conceptions of science is well recognized.
4
  
For this reason science per se is commonly conflated 
with natural science, and method is often equated 
with ‘the’ scientific method of the empirical sciences. 
However, a parallel problem results from an 
unreflectively ‘pop-hermeneutic’ or ‘pop-post-
modernist’ stance, one rarely recognized within the 
qualitative psychological literature (Applebaum, 
2010).
5
   
 
The stance I am referring to is summarized in the 
catch-phrase ‘everything is an interpretation’, which 
is sometimes expressed as a matter of fact rather than 
understood as a dubious truth-claim
6
. Within 
contemporary qualitative literature it is not difficult to 
find assertions that would lead students to believe that 
                                                 
3
 Eagleton (1996) has remarked upon this phenomenon 
among exponents of postmodernism. 
4
 Jagtenberg (1983) observes that naïve empiricism “is 
deeply entrenched in the standard scientific epistemology 
that is communicated to young scientists during their 
socialization” (p. 69). Stam (1992) notes that in psychology 
“The effects of positivism are insidious. Perhaps a more 
kindly description is that they serve as an unspoken 
grammar. We have taken in the residues of positivism (both 
logical and prelogical) with our education and we no longer 
acknowledge or recognize the roots of our methodologies” 
(p. 18).  
5
 Badiou (2004) has written that “three principle 
orientations can be distinguished in philosophy today” (p. 
42), namely hermeneutic, analytic, and postmodernist 
philosophies. Qualitative researchers like Gergen (1992), 
Kvale (1996), Smith et al. (2009), and Van Manen (1990) 
seize upon hermeneutic and/or postmodern philosophies to 
provide rationales for research praxes.  
6
 Eagleton (1996) observes that the slogan “everything is an 
interpretation” has added purchase “in an epoch when talk 
of ‘consciousness’ had ceased to be sexy”; instead it would 
appear “more advisable to speak of the world being 
constructed by, say, discourse rather than the mind,” and 
thus “everything would become an interpretation, including 
that claim itself” (p. 14). Davis (2009) has argued that 
within this discourse-centered worldview “a metaphysics of 
language is substituted for a metaphysics of truth” (p. 15). 
Commenting on Hirsch’s arguments against Gadamer, 
Polkinghorne (1983) observes that “The statement that is 
often used to question someone’s credibility, ‘That’s just 
your interpretation,’ would hold only if the person were 
unwilling to submit the interpretation to a validity process 
where it could be compared to other interpretations” (p. 
232). Arguably, such a validity process would require the 
strong commitment to methodical, systematic inquiry 
eschewed by the exponents of philosophical hermeneutics 
in psychological research (cf Smith et al., 2009). 
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they need have no concern for epistemology. In the 
literature referred to, epistemology is dismissed as a 
philosophical concern rather than a psychological 
one
7
. Similarly, some qualitative presentations give 
students the impression that construing research as 
‘interpretive’ gives the researcher license to make 
whatever she will of research data. Interpretation is 
framed as a liberating exercise in personal creativity 
unconstrained by intersubjective criteria
8
. Obviously 
this understanding of research, while ostensibly ‘user-
friendly’, is inimical to the actual practice of science. 
Students are also sometimes led to believe that the 
choice of a qualitative research method is a 
secondary, relatively unimportant matter to be guided 
solely by personal preference and ease of 
implementation; method being regarded as merely a 
(mechanical) means to a predetermined end, a 
misconception critiqued by Cheek (2008). 
 
These assumptions demonstrate an unsustainable 
aestheticizing and subjectivizing of research on the 
one hand, and an instrumentalizing conception of 
method on the other. The implied conceptions of 
qualitative research are impoverished and 
intellectually unsupportable, and would yield the field 
of psychology entirely to positivists, making it only 
too easy for empirical psychologists to conceive of 
themselves as the only genuine representatives of 
science
9
. The present article reflects a pedagogical 
commitment, because in teaching research methods a 
‘descriptivist’ researcher cannot afford to move 
directly to Mohanty’s philosophical resolution of the 
tension between description and interpretation. 
Inevitably a teacher must engage students’ recognized 
or unrecognized presuppositions indebted to 
popularizations of hermeneutics or postmodernism, 
because these often unexamined presuppositions 
shape the way we encounter the world as 
researchers
10
. The assumption that ‘everything is 
interpretation’ must be challenged in order to clear 
the ground for a consideration of other possibilities of 
                                                 
7 ἐπιστήµη (episteme) means both ‘knowledge’ and 
‘science’; when an epistemological interest is absent in 
qualitative research literature it indicates the lack of a 
motivating scientific interest. 
8
 When research is framed as an aesthetic activity, the 
emotional or intellectual ‘impact’ research has on its 
audience seems to be the only important criterion that 
remains; see Luce-Kapler (2008). 
9 Hence Proctor and Capaldi’s (2006) critique of the 
relativism endemic in much of qualitative psychological 
research literature bolsters their case that contemporary 
qualitative psychologists are merely repeating arguments 
made in the 5th century by the Greek Sophists. 
10
 As Feist (2006) observes, social constructivism and 
postmodernism have much in common. In the present study 
one might almost substitute ‘everything is interpretation’ 
with ‘everything is socially constructed’, since the 
implications for science are similar. 
seeing and knowing, such as descriptive 
phenomenology.  
 
This paper concerns appropriations (arguably 
misappropriations) of Gadamer’s hermeneutics in 
qualitative research. I have chosen to focus on a 
number of Gadamer’s philosophical assertions and 
indicate why using them as guides for qualitative 
psychological research is, in my estimation, 
misguided. I have previously offered a critical 
assessment of Van Manen’s appropriations of Husserl 
and Gadamer in the presentation of his hermeneutic 
phenomenology (Applebaum, 2007) as well as the 
ways in which Van Manen seeks to deploy Gadamer 
and Heidegger’s philosophy in advocating an 
aestheticizing approach to qualitative research 
(Applebaum, 2010). Due to the limits of space within 
this article I will present an overview of the problems 
that result from the appropriation of Gadamer’s work 
rather than developing detailed critiques of the 
specific ways in which Van Manen (1990), Kvale 
(1996), and Smith et al. (2009) mobilize Gadamer’s 
thought to support their research approaches.  
 
Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics 
 
In historical terms, the conflict between descriptive-
methodical and the interpretive-(un)methodical 
approach results from a cleavage regarding the 
meaning of human science that developed in the 
philosophy of science during the time of Dilthey 
(1833-1911) and Husserl. Dilthey (1989) argued that 
the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) ought to 
be established in a methodical, scientific manner that 
is true to their human subject matter rather than 
mimicking the sciences of nature. In Husserl’s (1977) 
words, Dilthey argued that “over and against … 
‘explanatory’ or ‘constructive’ psychology … there is 
a need of a ‘descriptive and analytic’ psychology” (p. 
4). Husserl (1977) maintained that human sciences 
such as psychology must discover their own, non-
empirical foundations, because the empiricist 
worldview can be distortive when applied to the 
phenomena of consciousness.  
 
Following the descriptive direction of Dilthey and 
Husserl, qualitative psychological researchers such as 
Giorgi (1970) view the empirical paradigm as a 
Procrustean bed that reduces and deforms its object, 
and argue that psychology ought to be founded as a 
rigorously methodical human science. However, for 
Gadamer, Husserl’s criticism of objectivism was 
inadequate. Warnke (1987) argues that Gadamer 
rejects Husserl’s approach to overcoming objectivism 
because: 
 
Phenomenology itself claims to be a science of 
the ways in which objects are given to 
consciousness — to be sure, not an ‘objective’ 
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science on the model of the natural sciences, 
but as Husserl always emphasizes, a ‘rigorous’ 
science none the less. (p. 36) 
 
Husserl’s scientific commitment is a problem for 
Gadamer. Gadamer’s work is animated by an 
ontological-aesthetic commitment rather than a 
scientific one, and he regards these two orientations 
as mutually exclusive.  
 
As noted, exponents of interpretative qualitative 
research often draw on Gadamer’s philosophical 
assertions to buttress their approaches. One or more 
of three of Gadamer’s philosophical assertions are 
frequently evident in the assumptive frameworks of 
‘hermeneutic’ or ‘interpretive’ researchers:  
 
• The human sciences have no method of their 
own and in principle can have none; 
• Every act of understanding is an ineluctably 
interpretive act; and  
• Human science is more akin to art than 





Psychological researchers whose approaches echo 
elements of Gadamer’s philosophy tend not to place 
priority on establishing the scientific status or 
methodological coherence of their praxes. Hence, 
Gergen (1992) and Van Manen (1990) represent 
epistemological-methodological questions as being 
only a secondary importance, the implication being 
that methodological clarity is not a prerequisite for 
qualitative research. These writers also suggest that 
the very notion of methodological rigour in human 
science is outmoded and obsolete.
12
  As a result the 
term ‘human’, the modifier in the phrase ‘human 
science’ is privileged, so to speak, while the modified 
noun ‘science’ is neglected by some psychological 
exponents of philosophical hermeneutics. Arguably, 
the original implication of the phrase ‘human science’ 
is that ‘science’ transcends its empirical 
interpretation, and that a human application would 
                                                 
11
Researchers who rely on Gadamer do not always endorse 
all of these assumptions or characterize their approaches as 
anti-methodical. Interpretive approaches as such are not 
necessarily anti-methodical, though interpreters who closely 
follow Gadamer not infrequently echo his disparaging 
account of method. 
12
 This attitude is conveyed in Van Manen’s (2002) remark 
that the “methods, techniques, form, and style” of 
qualitative research are “mundane issues,” whereas 
“questions of metaphysics … the limits of language … the 
enigmatic nature of words, text, interpretation, and truth” 
occur at a “more reflective level” (p. i). Van Manen’s 
(2002) counterpoising of meaning and method, implying 
that they are intrinsically in tension with each other, echoes 
the assumptions of philosophical hermeneutics. For a 
detailed critique of Gergen, see Chaikin (1992). 
similarly be possible. Thus it is only by adopting a 
forgetful or pejorative attitude toward ‘science’ that 
the ‘human' can be split from and exclusively 
emphasized over and against the scientific.  
 
Furthermore, qualitative researchers’ appropriations 
of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, much like their 
appropriations of the work of postmodern 
philosophers like Foucault or Derrida, are often 
unaccompanied by thorough explorations of how such 
philosophic assertions can be adapted to the human 
scientific subject matter (Giorgi, personal 
communication, August 7, 2010). Instead, writers 
often cite Gadamer’s work unaccompanied by 
detailed efforts to delineate the specifically 
psychological implications of these philosophical 
claims, or to justify Gadamer’s claims within, for 
example, the psychological domain (see Smith et al., 
2009).  
 
Invocations of Gadamer’s philosophy in the service of 
anti-methodical praxes are common. This continues to 
occur despite the fact that Gadamer (2006) responded 
to critics of Truth and Method by claiming that he 
“did not remotely intend to deny the necessity of 
methodical work within the human sciences” (p. 
xvii)
13
 and did not aim to provide guidance for the 
actual practice of human science research. While 
Husserl’s phenomenology was clearly intended as a 
propaedeutic to the human sciences, including 
psychology, Gadamer explicitly denies such an 
intention. Philosophical hermeneutics therefore does 
not offer support for the clarification of human 
science methods or propose criteria for scientific 
understanding, because this is not its purpose. 
According to Mendelson (1994) Gadamer “insisted 
that philosophical hermeneutics was not to be 
understood as a prescriptive methodology or 
epistemology but as ontology” (p. 118).
14
   
                                                 
13
 Nevertheless, Gadamer’s work does lend itself to the 
anti-methodical reading, a fact that prompted Habermas’ 
sustained critique of Truth and Method (Mendelson, 1994). 
For the purpose of this study, the term ‘anti-methodical’ is 
used to characterize research approaches that either directly 
challenge the validity of methodical inquiry in human 
science, or reject so-called ‘prescriptive’ methods in human 
science research, the reason being that in the absence of 
prescription (in the sense of explicit, understandable 
guidelines for inquiry) methodical research is impossible.  
14
 Freeman (2008) very usefully contrasts methodical 
hermeneutics (Dilthey, Betti, Hirsch), critical hermeneutics 
(Ricoeur, Habermas), and philosophical hermeneutics 
(Heidegger, Gadamer). She observes that only the latter 
approach is in principle opposed to methodical articulation, 
because for Heidegger and Gadamer the hermeneutic 
process “cannot be controlled … since there is no method 
that can predict in advance which prior conceptions or 
judgments will enable understanding from those that might 
obscure or distort it” (p. 386). Tellingly, ‘method’ is 
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For the preceding reasons, an important caveat must 
be made concerning my discussion of Gadamer’s 
work. For sympathetic readers of Gadamer, the use of 
philosophical hermeneutics by qualitative researchers 
to dilute or even reject methodical research praxes 
arguably represents a distortion of his philosophy. 
This study is an attempt to critique the appropriation 
of Gadamer’s philosophical work in the service of 
particular qualitative research agendas. I am not 
seeking to criticize Gadamer’s philosophy on its 
philosophical home-ground; that is, I am not 
criticizing Gadamer’s philosophy as ontology.  
 
In addition, I argue that Gadamer places emphasis on 
indeterminacy, fluidity, and ambiguity - in short, on 
the many ways in which lived-meanings can be 
obscure, uncertain, or constantly shifting. Focusing on 
this dimension of psychical phenomena may reflect 
Gadamer’s effort to counter objectivism’s hold upon 
contemporary thought (Bernstein, 1985). Nonetheless, 
from a phenomenological perspective the privileging 
of ambiguity can be detrimental to psychology 
because it reflects an imbalanced perspective, one 
neglectful of phenomenal givenness and the manifold 
ways in which givenness is constitutive of the life-
world. In Merleau-Ponty’s (1996) Phenomenology of 
Perception, for example, phenomenal ambiguity is 
both recognized and described, as in his brilliant 
account of sensory embodiment in the chapter “The 
Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology”.
15
   
 
In contrast to interpretive approaches, Giorgi’s 
descriptive approach to qualitative psychological 
research is shaped by Husserl’s philosophical 
phenomenological method. Giorgi (2009) seeks to 
articulate an approach to psychological inquiry that is 
scientific without subscribing to the natural sciences’ 
particular understandings of science and objectivity. 
Instead, psychology as a human science must 
demonstrate fidelity to the lived-phenomena of 
psychological subjectivity (Giorgi, 1970). He 
acknowledges that psychologists have not yet 
achieved broad consensus on the meaning of psyche 
or upon “the methods, procedures, rules of 
interpretation” (Giorgi, 1985, p. 45) appropriate to the 
study of the psychical. In this sense, psychology 
remains an incompletely founded science. In an effort 
to clarify the meaning of science for qualitative 
psychology, Giorgi (1997) has articulated criteria for 
science as a whole, qualitative or quantitative. He 
                                                                          
assumed to be predictive and to have a causal relationship 
with understanding. 
15
 He observes that phenomenological investigation does 
not reveal “a transparent world, free from obscurity and 
impenetrable solidity … but that ambiguous life in which 
the forms of transcendence have their Ursprung, and which 
… puts me in communication with them, and on this basis 
makes knowledge possible” (p. 364-365). 
proposes that to constitute science, a research 
approach must be able to yield knowledge that is 
systematic, methodical, general, and critical (1997, p. 
249). Thus, if a research approach is to claim human 
scientific status its advocates must be able to 
articulate criteria for science appropriate to the study 
of lived psychological subjectivity, must elaborate a 
sense of objectivity which demonstrates fidelity to 
human rather than natural phenomena, and must 
articulate their work in terms of a methodical praxis 
that can be taught to others.  
 
The conception of scientific method underlying 
Giorgi’s work is therefore broader than the particular 
meaning of ‘the’ scientific method arrived at by the 
natural sciences. This conception is founded in the 
root meaning of the Greek µέθοδος (methodos). As a 
descriptor of scientific practice, qualitative or 
quantitative, methodos implies a reliable path of 
inquiry that has been used and confirmed over time 
and can be shared with fellow travellers. If a method 
is scientific in this way it lends itself to being passed 
on to a community of fellow researchers whose 
discoveries can be shared and intersubjectively 
verified.
16
 Scientific discovery envisioned as a shared 
path of inquiry is never a private achievement, but 
always an implicitly communal one.  
 
I argue that Gadamer’s philosophical claims are 
unduly restrictive when appropriated as guides for the 
conducting of qualitative psychological research. In 
adopting the premises of philosophical hermeneutics 
to shape human scientific psychological research, 
researchers abandon the project of human science as 
envisioned by Dilthey and Husserl.
17
 Perhaps more 
importantly, they are also tacitly accepting the 
impossibility of a more inclusive, unifying conception 
of science that would enable qualitative and 
quantitative psychological researchers to talk to each 
other and provide rigorous criteria for our varied 
praxes. The unintended outcome is to strengthen 
empirical psychologists’ claims to be the only 
genuine representatives of psychological science. In 
relation to the hermeneutic critics of phenomeno- 
logical psychology, my argument is that engaging in 
methodical qualitative research need not imply an 
‘obsession with method’. With all due respect to 
Bernstein (1985), seeking a sense of objectivity 
                                                 
16
 Similarly, Kvale (1996) has addressed the mentoring 
aspect of educating others in qualitative interviewing.  
17
 Examples are Van Manen (1990) and Smith et al. (2009), 
both of whom cite Gadamer. Van Manen (1990) claims that 
his research approach is phenomenological because it has 
no method, and offers research procedures that are not to be 
used methodically. Smith et al. (2009) also make clear that 
the research procedures in Interpretive Phenomenology 
Analysis are not ‘prescriptive’, and thus are not to be 
implemented methodically. 
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appropriate for the psychical does not constitute 
objectivism, nor does seeking to articulate criteria for 




Method as Constitutive of Human Science 
 
The most fundamental cleavage between Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic philosophy when appropriated in the 
manner discussed above and Husserlian phenomen- 
ology as it has been adapted by Giorgi concerns the 
meaning and role of method in human science 
research. In continuity with the methodical-scientific 
concerns of Dilthey and Husserl, Giorgi’s 
phenomenological psychology views appropriate 
methods as critical to constituting human scientific 
praxis on its own home-ground, in contradistinction 
to the sciences of nature. Bernstein (1985) notes that 
“as Dilthey interpreted this challenge it meant 
showing that there is a distinctive subject matter and 
method appropriate to the Geisteswessenschaften that 
can equal and even rival the claim of the natural 
sciences to achieve ‘objective knowledge’” (p. 37). 
Giorgi’s (1970) position is that “if the full range of 
experience and behaviour of man as a person is to 
come under scientific scrutiny, then a different 
conception of scientific psychology will be necessary 
… one that will do justice both to the phenomenon of 
man as a person and to the practice of science” (p. 2). 
Giorgi’s project echoes Dilthey’s call for the 
development of appropriate methods that are as 
constitutive of human science as the empirical method 
is of natural science.  
 
Gadamer followed Husserl and Heidegger in 
criticizing the use of natural scientific procedures as a 
model for human scientific praxis. Gadamer argued 
that prejudice is inevitable, and that no set of 
methodical procedures is sufficient to guarantee 
absolute objectivity. This much is in accordance with 
Husserl’s phenomenology. However, Gadamer 
criticizes Dilthey’s scientific and methodological 
aims as demonstrating an inadequate distinction 
between natural and human science. For Gadamer, 
Dilthey responds in an insufficiently radical manner 
to Mill’s assertion that the human sciences ought to 
be understood “as empirical, inductive sciences 
differing only in degree from the natural sciences” 
(Bernstein, 1985, p. 37). For Gadamer the meanings 
of ‘science’ and ‘method’ are effectively exhausted 
by the natural sciences. The ‘human sciences’ are 
envisioned as an altogether distinct tradition and form 
                                                 
18
 Husserl’s theory of knowledge is expressed primarily in 
terms of perception (Pietersma, 2000). Husserl (1982) 
claimed that phenomenology is the genuine positivism 
because it insists on the primacy of and fidelity to what is 
perceived, or in Husserl’s words, “what can be seized upon 
originaliter” (p.39), in contrast to a privileging of theory 
over perception. 
of inquiry that ought not to seek to achieve scientific 
status and methodical rigour in a sense analogous to 
the sciences of nature. According to Gadamer (2006):  
 
However strongly Dilthey defended the 
epistemological independence of the human 
sciences, what is called ‘method’ in modern 
science remains the same everywhere and is 
only displayed in an especially exemplary 
form in the natural sciences. The human 
sciences have no method of their own. (p. 7, 
emphasis added)
19
   
 
Gadamer argues that what method cannot achieve in 
the human sciences “must - and effectively can - be 
achieved by a discipline of questioning and research, 
a discipline that guarantees truth” (1986, p. 447). 
However, as Bernstein (1985) observes, Gadamer “is 
employing a concept of truth that he never fully 
makes explicit” (p. 152). Thus, Gadamer neither 
clarifies what ‘truth’ means nor what its guarantee 
would entail; possibly doing so would bring 
hermeneutics too close to a methodical practice. 
Gadamer’s primary concern is to save our encounter 
with works of art and literature from the reductive, 
positivistic regard that he equates with science. As 
Risser (1997) notes, Gadamer’s mission is “in effect 
to reconstruct the humanist tradition in its broader 
perspective beyond the questions of method and 
objectivity” (p. 8, emphasis added). Gadamer wants 
to save the humanities from scientific reductionism 
but in so doing the meaning of ‘human science’ is 
conflated with the humanities and a ‘scientific’ sense 
of ‘human science’ is lost. 
 
For Husserl the problem is a very different one; what 
is needed is not to set aside method and scientific 
objectivity, but instead to discover the unique sense of 
method and objectivity suitable for the human 
domain, for subjective as opposed to natural 
phenomena. Philosophical hermeneutics claims that 
the interpretive experience of truth in relation to a 
work of art is unmediated and ungovernable by 
method, because “there is an experience of truth in art 
that goes beyond methodical knowledge” (Risser, 
1997, p. 56). By privileging an ontological conception 
of ‘experience’ over the epistemological clarification 
of experience, Gadamer maintains that “experience, 
which properly understood is inseparable from the 
element of historicity, is the alternative to method” 
(Risser, 1997, p. 210). Regarding Gadamer’s 
conception of experience, Risser (1997) explains: 
 
                                                 
19
 Given this comment it is difficult to understand the 
meaning of Gadamer’s claim that he does not seek to deny 
the necessity of methodical work within human science, 
unless he presumes that the human sciences will of 
necessity utilize empirical methods that are ‘not their own’. 
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Experience is more than a process in service to 
the objective order of scientific knowledge. 
But this does not mean that experience is 
consequently relegated to a mere subjective 
order. The issue is rather that genuine 
experience precedes the methodical process 
that produces scientific knowledge. Further- 
more, the account of experience has shown 
itself to hold within itself a conception of 
knowledge that is likewise independent of the 
methodological procedure of modern science. 
The concept of experience for which this 
knowing is appropriate emerges from practical 
life. (p. 105) 
 
The hermeneutic conception of experience carefully 
delineated by Risser (1997) is both close to and 
distant from that of Husserlian phenomenology. It 
could be said to designate lived-experiences in the 
life-world from within the natural attitude, but 
grasped ontologically. Husserl argued that lived-
experience has its own intrinsic modes of objectivity; 
furthermore, the phenomenological understanding of 
intentionality leads to a radical re-envisioning of the 
relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, the 
latter being immanent in rather than opposed to the 
former. Husserl never subordinates lived-experience 
to science; science is instead a particular attitude 
assumed in relation to experience, which always 
transcends the scientific standpoint. Furthermore, 
Husserl never reduces knowledge as such to the 
outcome of a particular method, although he seeks to 
found scientific knowledge in a methodical manner.  
 
In contrast, Gadamer opposes hermeneutics, 
philosophy, and the arts to science and method, which 
are equated with positivism. Consequently: 
 
The hermeneutic phenomenon is not a problem 
of method at all. It is not concerned with a 
method of understanding by means of which 
texts are subjected to scientific investigation 
like all of the objects of experience. It is not 
concerned primarily with amassing verified 
knowledge, such as would satisfy the 
methodological ideal of science … the human 
sciences are connected to modes of experience 
that lie outside science: with the experiences of 
philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These 
are all modes of experience in which a truth is 
communicated that cannot be verified by the 
methodological means proper to science. 
(Gadamer, 2006, p. xx-xxi) 
 
Gadamer characterizes science as a mere ‘amassing’ 
of ‘verified knowledge’, whereas the human sciences 
deal with an entirely different dimension of human 
experience, the realm of truth. In this respect, 
Gadamer was indebted to Heidegger’s ontological 
account of truth as an experience of disclosure rather 
than as an accurate perception (Palmer, 1969). The 
mode of experience that Gadamer terms hermeneutic 
is therefore an “event” that is a “disclosure of truth” 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 245).  
 
Seeking to contribute to the founding of the sciences, 
Husserl’s interest was primarily epistemological. His 
phenomenology recognizes an important distinction 
between meaningfulness and veracity (Seebohm, 
1982). This distinction, strangely absent from much 
of the hermeneutically-based psychological literature, 
which tends to emphasize the ontological ‘truth-
experience’, opens the researcher to engagement with 
a wide range of lived subjective and intersubjective 
phenomena and is critical for phenomenological 
psychological praxis. As Berger (1972) observes, 
Husserl’s phenomenology seeks to render explicit 
evidence of what is present to consciousness, just as it 
is present.
20
 However, such presences are not 
guarantees of truth; intuitions (the perception of 
wholes) are by no means infallible.
21
 Within 
phenomenological psychology a researcher may grasp 
the psychological structure of a lived experience in a 
rigorously objective way without passing a judgment 
as to the truth of that experience. Truth may be 
addressed, but grasping the lived-meaning of 
psychical experience takes priority. 
 
This occurs because the psychical realm is envisioned 
by phenomenological psychology as para-objective, 
para-rational, and para-normative. It is therefore a 
domain in which ‘truth’ may not be the most 
important question with respect to a given lived 
phenomenon (Giorgi, 1993). A hallucination can be 
perceptually present to my friend without requiring 
that I ascribe truthfulness to it — in fact, to be true to 
him I may be called upon to doubt the truthfulness of 
that which is so evidently present to him. The façade 
that presents itself to me as storefront may be 
recognized as a two-dimensional movie set. In Eye 
and Mind (1964) Merleau-Ponty evokes André 
Marchand’s words recalling the painter Paul Klee: 
 
                                                 
20
 That which is ‘evident’ for reflective consciousness is 
that which is perceptible, clear, or obvious, deriving from 
the Latin roots meaning ‘fully seen’. 
21
 Throughout the history of Western philosophy and 
psychology ‘intuition’ has signified the unmediated 
consciousness of something in contrast to mediate forms of 
knowing such as logical deduction; therefore, intuition has 
classically been held to be the guarantor of epistemic 
certainty. Giorgi (personal communication, June 2000) 
draws on Husserl’s work to define intuition as the 
presentational faculty of consciousness, that activity of 
consciousness that ‘makes present’ the objects of 
perception; within Husserl’s perceptual-presentational 
model the fulfillment of intuition in an act of understanding 
is a perceptual event. 
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‘In a forest, I have felt many times over 
that it was not I who looked at the forest. 
Some days I felt that the trees were 
looking at me, were speaking to me.’ 
(p.167) 
 
Such lived presences invite phenomenological 
inquiry. Husserlian phenomenology seeks to explicate 
the meanings implicit in an experience without 
needing to pass judgment on the truthfulness of the 
experience (Seebohm, 1982). We therefore seek to 
elicit descriptions that are loyal to what has been 
lived, and this does not require us to assess the 
truthfulness of the experience itself as a matter of 
fact. Hence we can interview subjects who report 
having seen ghosts, without having to affirm or deny 
the existence of the ghosts themselves. For 
phenomenology, evidence “is a special mode of the 
intentional relation connecting the subject to his 
thoughts,” and the correlative “is not truth, it is 
objectivity” (Berger, 1972, p. 67-68).  
 
Bernstein (1985) notes that throughout Gadamer’s 
career he “sought to show that the humanistic 
tradition, properly understood, is an essential 
corrective to the scientism and obsession with 
instrumental technical thinking that is dominant 
today” (p. 180). It is these humanistic disciplines, 
such as philosophy, the arts, and history, which 
Gadamer maintains have no method of their own. 
This absence of human scientific method(s) 
represents a fact rather than a challenge for Gadamer; 
he does not explore alternate, non-positivistic 
conceptions of science and method as this is not his 
interest. He makes no effort to articulate a method for 
the human sciences; in Truth and Method nothing like 
a ‘hermeneutical method’ is proposed as an 
alternative to empiricism, because for him methodical 
articulation would be a misguided task that is 
fundamentally untrue to (at least) the philosophical 
meaning of the human sciences. As Moran (2000) 
writes, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics “is 
neither an art nor method of providing accurate 
interpretations, nor a way of regulating interpretation” 
(p. 270); instead a methodological interest is entirely 
absent. Gadamer is “constantly battling against the 
intrusion of method into hermeneutics and the 
Geisteswissenschaften” (Bernstein, 1985, p. 45) 
because for him the methodical standpoint implies a 
positivism that is intrinsically alien to the human 
sciences. Unfortunately, as Bernstein (1985) 
recognizes, Gadamer’s critique of scientism 
frequently appears to constitute a critique of science 
as a whole. Similarly, Gadamer’s opposition to 
objectivism often seems to constitute a rejection of 
the notion of objectivity itself. Eagleton (1983/2008) 
has written that for Gadamer, “all interpretation is 
situational, shaped and constrained by the historically 
relative criteria of a particular culture; there is no 
possibility of knowing the literary text ‘as it is’” (p. 
62). Yet Gadamer does not directly espouse 
relativism, he appeals to ‘tradition’ as the guarantor of 
intersubjective consensus, but this sense of tradition 
does not provide support for grounding scientific 
practice as this is not its intention.
22
   
 
From a phenomenological psychological perspective, 
Gadamer surrenders the field of science to the 
empiricists. This yielding appears to be the only 
means by which the human sciences are to be freed 
from positivism. In this sense, Gadamer does not seek 
to rescue the sciences from empiricism, but rather to 
rescue the human sciences from science. His 
references to ‘science’ designate empiricism just as 
his references to ‘scientific method’ designate the 
empirical method. The Geisteswissenschaften, for 
Gadamer, have an autonomous existence apart from 
science, indeed it was precisely this yielding of 
science as methodical inquiry to the positivists that 
led to Habermas’ (1990) early, critical review of 
Truth and Method. Mendelson’s (1994) summary of 
Habermas’ critique, first published in 1967, which is 
relevant for qualitative researchers, is that: 
 
This opposition between hermeneutical 
experience and methodical knowing is stated 
too abstractly … according to Habermas, the 
roots of this problem lie in Gadamer’s 
Heidegerrian-ontological self-understanding, 
which does not lend itself to the normative-
methodological task of making hermeneutic 
consciousness effective within science. As a 
result of this self-understanding, Gadamer is 
too willing to grant the positivists control over 
the definition of scientific method and then to 
show its limits by reference to other 
experiences of truth, rather than to develop an 
alternative concept of method which is 
hermeneutically enlightened. (p. 117-118) 
 
At this stage it is possible to draw some initial 
conclusions regarding the consequences for 
qualitative psychology of adopting Gadamer’s 
philosophy as a guide. Researchers would not be 
invested in establishing their work as scientific, since 
‘science’ is regarded as a restrictive, exclusively 
positivist notion that is fundamentally alien to the 
                                                 
22
 Gadamer’s understanding of ‘tradition’ has been 
critiqued as inadequate by Eagleton (1983/2008), for whom 
Gadamer’s reliance upon ‘tradition’ evinces “a grossly 
complacent theory of history, the projection onto the world 
at large of a viewpoint for which ‘art’ means chiefly the 
classical monuments of the high German tradition … 
historical differences are tolerantly conceded, but only 
because they are effectively liquidated by an understanding 
which ‘bridge[es] the temporal distance which separates the 
interpreter from the text’” (p. 63). 
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ontological meaning of the Geisteswissenschaften. 
Scientific criteria and methodological concerns would 
be immaterial for the conduct of qualitative 
psychological inquiry, since such concerns represent 
artefacts of an already-transcended positivism. 
Instead, the implicit criterion by which qualitative 
research would be evaluated would be the degree to 
which such research yields a ‘truth experience’. It is 
questionable whether such a practice should even be 
framed as ‘psychological research’, the language of 
‘encounter’ or ‘disclosure’ might be more descriptive. 
In experiential terms these consequences may be seen 
as liberating and unproblematic, freeing researchers to 
a fuller encounter with lived-subjectivity analogous to 
the encounter with works of art. Problems arise only 
if human scientific psychology is viewed as a 
discipline that seeks to build a body of rigorous, 
intersubjective knowledge for a community of fellow-
researchers.  
 
For Gadamer faith in a method leads to a denial of 
one’s own historicity. Consequently ‘method’ and 
‘objectivity’ must be transcended because, from this 
perspective, they necessarily imply the natural 
scientific worldview. As Risser (1997) explains, 
Gadamer claims that “there are modes of experience 
in which a truth is communicated that is not simply a 
matter of verification through the methodological 
procedure of modern empirical science” (p. 5). This 
observation is fully in line with Husserl’s critique of 
empiricism; the difference is that in Gadamer’s work, 
the critique appears directed against science as a 
whole. 
 
It might be argued that Gadamer’s work can be serve 
as corrective for those researchers (qualitative or 
quantitative) who are prone to naively assume that the 
mechanical implementation of a method guarantees 
the truth of findings. However, this argument would 
be flawed because Gadamer seeks to set aside the 
methodical interest, not support an awakened, self-
responsible methodical praxis. Hence, if the practice 
of science requires method, Gadamer’s philosophical 
perspective cannot contribute to the conduct of 
science by researchers, because from this perspective 
methodical praxis is regarded as irredeemable or at 
least intrinsically naïve. It therefore appears that 
philosophical hermeneutics can only contribute to a 
retrospective interpretation of the limitations of 
scientific praxis, not support an improved praxis. 
 
It is arguably misguided to seek guidance for the 
practice of actual human science research in 
Gadamer’s work, since he clearly offered a 
philosophical reflection, not a reflection on how, in 
practice, human science research could be effectively 
conducted. He clearly stated: 
 
I did not intend to produce an art or technique 
of understanding … I did not wish to elaborate 
a system of rules to describe, let alone direct, 
the methodical procedure of the human 
sciences … nor was it my aim to investigate 
the theoretical foundation of work in these 
fields in order to put my findings to practical 
ends. (Gadamer, 1986, p. xvi) 
 
Gadamer (2006) responded to the criticism that Truth 
and Method is an anti-methodical text by maintaining 
that he had not denied the necessity of methodical 
human science research (p. xvii). He states that “my 
real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do 
or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over 
and above our wanting and doing” (2006, p. xxv-
xxvi). From a phenomenological standpoint, this 
distinction is problematic because it implies an 
untenable split between the conscious intention of the 
practicing researcher in engaging with participants 
and data analysis, and what according to Gadamer 
maintains is ‘really’ occurring in the research process 
from a philosophical perspective. The distinction 
seems to be that the scientific researchers are naïve to 
their own praxis in a fundamental way that 
hermeneuticians are not. This split might be accurate 
in the case of a naïve researcher, one who 
demonstrates the kind of unreflectively reifying 
attitude critiqued by Cheek (2008), but experienced 
psychological researchers need not be so naïve. 
 
Although Gadamer’s qualifications of his standpoint 
are problematic they reveal that it is not possible to 
inscribe philosophical hermeneutics as one-sidedly 
‘anti-methodical’. Dostal (1987) has argued that a 
range of traditional and normative interpretive 
practices underlie Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and 
disputes the characterization of Truth and Method as 
anti-methodical, arguing that Gadamer “presupposes 
for any approach to a text something like the 
traditional philological practices in which he was 
trained” (p. 425-426). If this is correct, Dostal (1987) 
has illuminated an aspect of Gadamer’s thought that 
is problematic for qualitative research; Gadamer 
appears to operate within methodical philological 
praxes, but his account of understanding renders these 
praxes invisible because his interest is ontological 
rather than epistemological. In addition, while 
adequate consensus regarding methodical philological 
praxes may well exist within the high German 
tradition in which Gadamer was educated, no such 
consensus exists within the far younger tradition of 
qualitative psychological research. (This consequence 
flows from the application to psychology of Eagleton’s 
(1983/2008) critique of Gadamer’s conception of 
‘tradition’.) As a result of this implicit consensus 
within the high German literary tradition, Gadamer 
can privilege the ‘truth-experience’ as lived-
disclosure while leaving implicit the methods that 
prepare the ground for such disclosure. This criticism 
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of Gadamer as a guide for psychological research is 
predicated upon a Husserlian phenomenological 
conception of method, which is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
‘Method’ in Phenomenological Psychology 
 
As was previously noted, within phenomenology 
µέθοδος (methodos) implies a shared path of inquiry 
in which others can be mentored, and which yields 
reliable knowledge for a community of fellow 
researchers. Husserl (1977) described method in the 
following manner which, paralleling Giorgi’s criteria 
for science, applies to both qualitative and 
quantitative inquiry:  
 
Method means: goal-directed activity in an 
intelligible, insightful manner, which is fit to 
lead to the goal. Still better, we should say: 
goal-directed doing, which, with its stage-
points, these products, presents the way which 
the doer goes, goes by doing and seeing. (p. 
173, n.1) 
 
In order to achieve intersubjective knowledge, the 
execution of a method must be adequately transparent 
and related to an expressed goal. In the context of 
Husserl’s phenomenology, which is a philosophy of 
intuition (also in Giorgi’s (2009) approach to 
phenomenological psychological research), method 
sets the context and guiding structure for a discovery 
process that must remain open-ended.
23
 Thus, 
phenomenological psychology human scientific 
inquiry requires that the researcher engage in an on-
going, dynamic balancing of ‘form’ (structure, 
essentially repeatable steps, clarity of procedures) and 
‘formlessness’ (sensitivity, openness, suspension of 
preconceptions regarding the data, and adaptability to 
the data as it presents itself). Research praxis requires 
a mixture of structure and openness that are 
understood as jointly constitutive of human-scientific 
discovery.  
 
It is therefore obvious that when method is conceived 
of reductively, for example in Cheek’s (2008) words 
as “a series of steps that must be undertaken in order 
to produce a predetermined form of research report or 
finding” (p. 205), then the sense of ‘method’ and 
‘research’ within phenomenology are falsified. 
Phenomenologists criticize the reification of research 
methods, on the one hand, and the arbitrariness or 
failure to adequately shape and guide inquiry on the 
other. In response to Osborn and Smith (2008), Giorgi 
                                                 
23 ‘Intuition’ (Ger: Anschauung) is a descriptive-technical 
term in phenomenology that designates the presentational 
function of consciousness. For phenomenology, intuition 
does not imply reliance upon ‘hunches’, ‘mystical 
apprehension’, or ‘tacit knowledge’. 
(2010) argues that either extreme severely limits the 
value of research findings.  
 
Toussulis (personal communication, April 13, 2010) 
frames method envisioned phenomenologically as a 
‘scaffold’. This is a fortunate choice of words, 
because lexically a ‘scaffold’ can be a ‘platform’, a 
‘skeletal framework’, a ‘stage’, or a ‘bridge’, and all 
of these meanings may be relevant for the 
phenomenological conception of method. The 
Husserlian method articulated by Giorgi for 
psychological research does not seek to predetermine 
the outcome of a given study. For example, if an 
interviewer has interviewed four participants 
regarding an experience in which they learned 
something it is not possible to assume that the data 
will reveal a shared psychological structure to the 
phenomenon of learning. The method aims at 
discovery, not validation of a predetermined 
hypothesis. 
 
Instead of a verificatory attitude, a phenomenological 
researcher adopts an attitude of sensitivity to the 
possibility of such commonality emerging in the 
course of data analysis. Results present themselves 
through the course of analysis rather than being 
preconceived, and findings are not arrived at until the 
end of the research process. If method is conceived of 
as (for example) a bridge, it is the supporting 
structure that makes this journey from indeterminacy 
to determinacy (in other words, the fulfilment of 
disciplinary intuitions) possible.
24
 Basing his 
psychological research method on Husserl’s 
philosophical method, Giorgi adopts the epoché, 
bracketing, and imaginative variation as the core 
procedures supporting the inquiry. The research 
process is further shaped by the division of interview 
transcripts into meaning units, transforming the 
meaning units into psychologically-revelatory 
language using imaginative variation, explication of 
the meaning units to unfold the psychological 
meanings given in the data, and finally varying of the 
transformed data of multiple participants to see 
whether a common psychological structure or 
structures emerge.
25
 The bridge of method is what 
makes this journey possible but the method does not 
predetermine what will be found nor ensure that a 
unifying psychological structure is present. To 
discover that four research participants have 
experienced learning in fundamentally different 
                                                 
24
 Polanyi (1969), a non-phenomenologist, examined 
intuition in the context of scientific discovery, arguing that 
“The structure of scientific intuition is the same as that of 
perception,” and commenting that intuition “is not more 
mysterious than perception—but not less mysterious either” 
(p. 118). 
25
 For a detailed exposition of the method, see Giorgi 
(2009). 
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psychological ways (i.e., four substantially distinct 
psychological structures) would itself be a legitimate 
research finding.  
 
According to Husserl (1970/1989), phenomenology 
aims at making insights “accessible to scientific 
understanding, through a method of disclosure 
appropriate to it, as a realm of experiential and 
theoretical self-evidence” (p. 119). Quâ discovery, 
phenomenological research findings are only 
recognized in their disclosure. This disclosure is 
prepared for in numerous ways: through the 
disciplinary context (the choice of a psychological 
interest rather than, for example, a sociological one); 
the disciplinary sensitivity of the researcher based on 
her training; the focus on a particular phenomenon; 





Since phenomenology envisions method as a 
framework within which disciplinary intuitions occur, 
the researcher must carefully avoid reification, instead 
adopting an attitude of disposability to discovery. 
This can also be described as an attitude of 
attentiveness, which Giorgi (1985) refers to as 
“‘circumscribed indeterminateness’ or ‘empty 
determinitiveness’” (p. 13). He bases this presentation 
on Merleau-Ponty’s (1996) account in the 
Phenomenology of Perception of “that circumscribed 
ignorance, that still ‘empty’ but already determinate 
intention which is attention itself” (p. 28). Hence the 
phenomenological researcher’s attitude is character- 
ized both by ‘form’ and ‘formlessness’ or openness in 
order to be disposable to the discovery process itself 
within the context of a disciplinary inquiry (such as 
psychology).   
 
The foregoing sketch of phenomenological inquiry 
demonstrates that the phenomenological researcher 
must be very reflective regarding the meaning of the 
steps in the method while she engages in them; 
reification is not an option because it falsifies the 
meaning of the method and vitiates findings. 
Methodical inquiry is something that, if unreflectively 
engaged in, loses its meaningfulness. This fact is 
aligned with Kvale’s (1996) assertion that the 
qualitative researcher must be as concerned with what 
                                                 
26
 Phenomenological psychology maintains that one can 
develop one’s sensitivity to psychological phenomena while 
bracketing any theory-laden interpretive perspectives 
regarding such phenomena. In other words, the meaning of 
‘psychology’ is not exhausted by any given psychological 
theory; on the contrary, psychological theories if they are 
coherent rely upon a more inclusive conception of the 
psychological. Hence, one does not engage in phenomeno-
logical research as a cognitive-behaviorist or a Jungian, 
though one may choose to dialogue with these theoretical 
perspectives in the light of one’s descriptive research 
findings. 
it means to use a method as she is concerned with 
how to implement the procedures of that method. I 
would add one qualification to Kvale’s (1996) 
distinction - namely, that in the practice of 
phenomenological research, adequately enacting a 
methodical step (like imaginative variation) is 
inseparable from the meaningful intention animating 
that enactment. In other words, there are no genuinely 
‘mechanical’ steps in phenomenological research. 
The implicit dichotomy between mechanical and 
meaningful steps in research is a relic of the empirical 
attitude in which (perhaps) there are steps that may be 
taken unreflectively. Even the division of an 
interview transcript into meaning units (for Giorgi, 
meaning units are created solely for the convenience 
of the researcher in conducting analysis) is not 
mechanical, because the researcher establishes 
divisions in the transcript based on felt shifts in 
meaning.  
 
The observation that researchers can adopt a reifying 
attitude toward their method, one that lends itself to a 
mechanical conception of the research process, is an 
insight sometimes attributed to hermeneutics. 
However, this recognition is also evident in Husserl’s 
phenomenology. In Crisis (1970/1989) he observes 
“to the essence of all method belongs the tendency to 
superficialize itself in accord with technization” (p. 
48).
27
 In a passage conveying the phenomenological 
critique of the inadequate practice of methodical 
research, an alternative to Gadamer’s position is seen; 
in describing scientific methods in general, Husserl 
(1970/1989) writes that: 
 
The developed method, the progressive 
fulfillment of the task, is, as method, an art 
(τέχνη) which is handed down; but its true 
meaning is not necessarily handed down with 
it. And it is precisely for this reason that a 
theoretical task and achievement like that of a 
natural science (or any science of the world) –
which can master the infinity of its subject 
matter through infinities of method [footnote: 
“i.e. the infinite pursuit of its method”] can 
master the latter infinities only by means of a 
technical thought and activity which are empty 
of meaning - can only be and remain 
                                                 
27
 As will be recalled, Husserl’s core argument in Crisis 
(1970) is that “The splitting of the world and the 
transformation of its meaning were the understandable 
consequences of the exemplary role of the natural-scientific 
method—or, to put it another way, natural-scientific 
rationality—a role which was indeed quite unavoidable at 
the beginning of the modern period” (p. 60-61). Although 
Husserl was by no means the sole philosophical critic of the 
natural sciences, a consideration of Husserl’s foundational 
work makes it immediately evident why Ricoeur 
(1975/1981) acknowledged phenomenology as the 
“unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics” (p. 101). 
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meaningful in a true and original sense if the 
scientist has developed in himself the ability to 
inquire back into the original meaning  of all 
his meaning-structures and methods, i.e. into 
the historical meaning of their primal 
establishment , and especially into the meaning 
of all the inherited meanings taken over 
unnoticed in this primal establishment, as well 
as those taken over later on. (p. 56) 
 
Critically, Husserl has included the Greek τέχνη 
(techné) to emphasize his precise meaning. In 
Husserl’s characterization of scientific method as 
τέχνη it is important to appreciate that the meaning of 
techné is closer to ‘craft’ or ‘craftsmanship’ than to 
popular contemporary conceptions of ‘art’, which 
bear the imprint of romanticism.
28
 When Husserl 
points to the risk that any method can be 
superficialized through technization he does not mean 
that a praxis which ought to be conceived of as an 
aesthetic activity instead becomes reduced to 
technique. Instead, he means that the practitioner has 
lost sight of the full meaning of a methodical 
technique or craft and reduced her praxis to an empty 





This loss is to be avoided through a reflective rather 
than a naïve conception of science, embodied in an 
awakened scientific practice. However, a natural 
scientist, to the extent that she aims solely at 
becoming merely “a highly brilliant technician of the 
method”, is normally “not at all able to carry out such 
reflections” (Husserl, 1970/1989, p. 56-57). Also, the 
development of the sciences requires such dedication 
to the refinement of technique that such lapses are 
inevitable. For qualitative researchers, Husserl’s 
Crisis ought to be read not only as a critique of the 
natural sciences but as a critique of the reification of 
method in principle. Following Husserl, Giorgi 
(1985) argues that since phenomenology envisions 
research as a discovery process rather than a process 
of verification, the reification of any research method 
is antithetical to the meaning of research. 
 
Kvale (1996) draws upon Gadamer’s anti-methodical 
                                                 
28
 The classical sense of techné implied “an art or craft, i.e. 
a set of rules, system or method of making or doing, whether 
of the useful arts, or of the fine arts” (Liddell & Scott, 1940, 
paragraph 4). When τέχνη was used to describe painters or 
sculptors in antiquity, it did not designate a romantically 
elevated ‘fine art’, but rather a workman’s trade, which is 
why the same term was used to describe the creation of 
sculpture, shipbuilding, and metalwork. 
29
 In just the same fashion, for qualitative psychology the 
alternative to scientism is not art (in the sense of 
aestheticized praxis) but rather a practice reflecting the 
genuine (full) meaning of science. 
work in his discussion of qualitative interviewing. 
Citing Gadamer, Kvale (1996) questions whether 
“qualitative interviewing is most fruitfully conceived 
of as a method or as a craft” (p. 77).
30
 Based on the 
preceding discussion of τέχνη it is evident that it is 
unnecessary to accept the implied dichotomy. Kvale’s 
(1996) discussion of interviewing is excellent and his 
distinction is meaningful (and perhaps even critical) 
when responding to an empirical perspective. 
However, from a phenomenological perspective the 
split between method and craft is a false dichotomy 
and could be seized upon to support an unfortunate 
aestheticizing of research. Indeed Kvale (1996) writes 
that “interview research is a craft that, if well carried 
out, can become an art” (p. 15). The following 
passage from Kvale (1996) offers useful guidance, 
but only if method is viewed in an exclusively 
positivistic sense: 
 
Conceiving of qualitative research interviewing 
as a method or as a craft involved different 
logics of practice, and melding the two 
approaches may lead to a muddled practice and 
broken expectancies. Thus the methodical 
requirements of standard predetermined 
wording and sequences of questions, which are 
necessary in the method of survey 
interviewing, will block the force of the 
qualitative interview craft, which rests on 
personal competence and judgment in the 
wording and sequencing of questions. 
Demands of advance explicit formulations of 
procedures and questions for a research 
inquiry, which depend on the skills and know-
how of the researcher, marginalize personal 
intuition, flexibility, and creativity in interview 
research … the very personal interaction of the 
interview, and the interpersonal skills required 
of the interviewer, defy any formalization into 
impersonal methodic procedures. (p. 88)  
 
As in a craft, Kvale (1996) argues that learning 
requires apprenticeship to an experienced practitioner. 
He argues for a shift “from interview research as 
methodological rule following, with method as a truth 
guarantee, to research as a craft, where craftsmanship 
is learned through practice, and the value of the 
knowledge produced is the key quality criterion” (p. 
304). Such insights are valuable, but reflect an 
unnecessary limitation to the way in which we 
understand method. 
 
                                                 
30
 Kvale (1996) observes that: “in the tradition of Gadamer 
(1975), it is … explicitly rejected that hermeneutics is a 
method, and instead understanding is posited as the 
fundamental mode of being for humans” (p. 211). 
Nevertheless, Kvale (1996) seeks to unfold the implications 
of hermeneutics for method. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the second part of this article I will explore the 
meaning of ‘disclosure’ in science from a Husserlian 
perspective, discuss some of the implications of 
Gadamer’s rejection of Husserl’s philosophical 
method, and propose some of the consequences of 
seeking to structure human scientific psychological 
research using Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
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